

The Meaning of *bāhyārtha* in Dignāga's and Jinendrabuddhi's Theories of Inference

by
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1. Introductory remarks

In an earlier paper, “Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion” (henceforth Shiga 2011b), I proposed the hypothesis that the theory of all-inclusive pervasion (*sarvopasaṃhā-ravyāpti*), considered to have been created by Dharmakīrti, in fact originated in Dignāga's theory of inference. The statement of Dignāga's in question, which appears in the third chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (henceforth PSV), is the following:

To be more precise, the co-existence [of a logical reason] with such an [object to be proved] is understood by means of two [types of] exemplification based on similarity or dissimilarity, [in] which [the property to be proved] is associated¹ with external thing[s² that respectively have the proving property] (*bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena*).³

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¹ As we will see below, Jinendrabuddhi understands the word *upasaṃhṛta* or *upasaṃhāra* as forming part of the compound *bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta* or *bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra* as *upadarśita* (PST D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2), *upanayana* or *prakāśana* (PST D230a3; P260b5; Skt. PST B185a2). Moreover, he interprets the word *upasaṃhāra* as “associating/bringing the [property] to be proved with/near all the proving [properties]” elsewhere in the same chapter (PST D227b1; P257b7f.: *nye bar bsdu ba ni med na mi 'byung ba nyid de[ste P] / thams cad du sgrub par byed pa la bsgrub par bya ba nye bar bsdu ba ste / nye bar 'dren pa'o // Skt. B182b6f.: upasaṃhāro 'vinābhāvitvam, sarvatra sādhanasādhyasopasaṃharaṇam upanayaḥ*). Therefore, it would be more appropriate in this case to translate *upasaṃhṛta* as “associated,” “applied” or “brought near” than as “summed up” (Shiga 2011b: 525 with n. 14) or “included,” as in the case of Dharmakīrti's term *sarvopasaṃhāra* (HB 5*, 21), which could be translated as “including” or “summing up [the property to be proved in] all the [property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]” (HBT 62, 18–20: *sarvasmin sādhanadharmavati dharmiṇi, na drṣṭāntadharmiṇy eva, sādhyadharmasopasaṃharaṇam upasaṃhāro dhaukanaṃ ...*). Meanwhile, it should be noted here that Arcaṭa glosses *upasaṃhāra* as *dhaukana* (“bringing [the property to be proved] near [all the property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]”). Taking this interpretation into consideration, it is probable that the word *upasaṃhāra*, even in the compound *sarvopasaṃhāra*, could mean “associating” or “applying” rather than “summing up” or “including.”

² According to Jinendrabuddhi, *bāhyārtha* is to be understood not as a single and particular individual (PST D215a4f.; P244b2; Skt. B171a2f.: ... *ekatraiva vyaktiviśeṣe pradarśanasya prādhānyanirāsaparam draṣṭavyam*), but as a whole assembly of things (PST D215a3; P244a8f.; Skt. B171b7: *sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadrṣṭāntalakṣaṇo 'rtharāśir drṣṭāntaḥ, na tu ghaṭa eva*) or the generalized property-bearer as opposed to the particular property-bearer to be proved (PST D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2: *dharmiṇaḥ pakṣikṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānye ...*).

³ PSV(K) P138a6f.: *de 'dra ba'i lhan cig rgyu ba nyid ni phyi rol gyi don nye bar sdud par byed pa chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa'i dpe gnyis po dag gis rtogs pa yin te / PSV(V) D51a7–b1;*

This statement coincides with Dharmakīrti's formulation of all-inclusive pervasion in his *Hetubindu*⁴ (henceforth HB). Considering various factors, I concluded that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shared the idea that pervasion is established or confirmed by taking individual cases⁵ into account.⁶

As I mentioned in Shiga 2011b, the term *bāhyārtha* also appears several times in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (henceforth PS) and the PSV in the expressions *bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra*, *bāhyārthapradarśana*, *bāhyārthāpekṣā*, as well as *bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta*. These examples of its use need to be examined in a new light to clarify the relationship between *bāhyārtha* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*. This paper aims to further investigate various issues that were not settled in Shiga 2011b, including the following: (1) What do Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi mean by the term *bāhyārtha* used in logical contexts, mainly in the PS and PSV 4? (2) Does it literally denote “an external object,” that is, “a thing in the external world as an object of cognition,” or does it denote “something external to the subject or the property-bearer to be proved,” as Jinendrabuddhi understands it? (3) In this case, does Jinendrabuddhi deviate from Dignāga's original intention by adopting Dharmakīrti's theories when he interprets Dignāga, or are his comments on the term *bāhyārtha* in keeping with Dignāga's intention? (4) What is the relationship between the terms *bāhyārtha* and *bahirvyāpti*?

2. Usage examples for the term *bāhyārtha* in the PS/PSV 4

2.1. Regarding the role of *dr̥ṣṭānta*⁷

First, we will observe an example of Dignāga's use of the term *bāhyārtha* in PS/PSV 4, where he defines the role of *dr̥ṣṭānta*.⁸

P54b6f.: *de dang mthun pa dang lhan cig tu rgyu ba nyid dang / chos mthun pa'am chos mi mthun pa nyid kyi[nyid can gyis D] phyi rol gyi don nye bar bsdus nas dpe gnyis kyi go bar byed do //* (Skt. reconstruction: **tādṛksābhavyaṃ hi sādharmaṇa vaidharmaṇa vā bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena dr̥ṣṭāntadvayena gamyate.*) See also Shiga 2011b: 524–526 with n. 11–18.

⁴ HB 5*, 18–22: *tasya dvividhā prayogaḥ; sādharmaṇa vaidharmaṇa ca, yathā yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, saṃś ca śabda iti, tathā kṣaṇikatvābhāve sattvābhāvaḥ, saṃś ca śabda ity anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sarvopasaṃhāreṇa vyāptipradarśanalakṣaṇau sādharmaṇavaidharmaṇaprayogau.*

⁵ While Dignāga states “external case[s]” (*bāhyārtha*), Dharmakīrti refers to “all cases” (*sarva*).

⁶ See Shiga 2011b: 532f.

⁷ In Dignāga's system of logic, the word *dr̥ṣṭānta* has two different meanings: an actual example or a thing (*artha*, *abhidheya*) and an exemplification or a statement (*vacana*, *abhidhāna*). (See Katsura 2004: 141f.)

⁸ See Shiga 2011b: 527. In PS 4.2 *dr̥ṣṭānta* is defined differently as follows: *sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā / khyāpyate yatra dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharmaṇetaro dvividhā //* (See Jambuvijaya 1966:133. This verse is quoted in *Daśavaikālikasūtrahāribhadhrīṣṭi* 34b. Cf. *NMukh* 11.) “The example is a [thing] in which it is conveyed that a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved and that [the logical reason] is absent when what is to be proved is absent. This is in two forms: [the example on the basis of] similarity and the other (= the example on the basis of dissimilarity).” (See also Katsura 2004: 141 with n. 11.)

Reconstructed text⁹ of PSV on PS 4.3 (= Appendix [2]):¹⁰

evam tarhi ghaṭo 'nudāharaṇam. tatra hi yathā hetuḥ sādhyānugataḥ, tathā sādhyam api hetvanugatam iti cet. na, avivakṣitatvāt [yathā]¹¹ kṛtakatvaviśeṣasya hetutvena, tathā ghaṭe sādhyānugamasya. bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam.¹²

[Question:] If so (= if the example on the basis of similarity is defined as a thing in which a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved),¹³ a pot would not [constitute a valid] exemplification, because in the [pot], just as a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved, what is to be proved is [also] accompanied by the logical reason.

[Answer:] This is not [right], because just as being produced as a particular property is not intended to be the logical reason, what is to be proved is [not intended to be] accompanied [by the logical reason] in a pot[, which is a particular thing, even though that is the case],¹⁴ for the primary [role] of exemplification is to indicate external thing[s].¹⁵

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the term *bāhyārtha* as follows:

⁹ Words in roman type are found in the PST or in the fragments, whereas those in *italics* are reconstructed. The Sanskrit reconstructions of the Tibetan translations of PS/PSV 3 and 4 cited in this paper, other than a few passages, are part of the achievements of the PST seminar organized and led by Prof. Shōryū Katsura at Ryūkoku University. I would like to specially thank all the participants of this seminar, especially Dr. Yasuhiro Okazaki, who made Sanskrit reconstructions and editions of PS/PSV/PST 4; Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe, who checked and corrected Dr. Okazaki's draft; Prof. Diwakar Acharya for his valuable comments and suggestions on the Sanskrit reconstructions; and Prof. Katsura for permission to use these results and other relevant materials. Any errors that remain are my own.

¹⁰ See also Shiga 2011b: 527 with n. 21–24.

¹¹ No equivalent in PSV(K).

¹² PSV(K): P148b4–6: 'on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bzhin du / bsgrub bya yang gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no zhe na / ma yin te / byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gro ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // PSV(V) D60b1–3; P64a6f.: gal te 'di ltar bum pa dper brjod pa de lta na ni ji ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya dang ldan pa de ltar bsgrub bya gtan tshigs dang ldan par 'gyur ro zhe na ma yin te / brjod par mi bya ba'i phyir te / bum pa ni gang bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba can gyis[gyi P] byas pa nyid kyi khyad par du byas pa brjod par bya ba'i phyir ro // ngag gi don bstan pa ni nges par bstan pa'i don gtso bo yin no // (See also Katsura 2004: 155 with n.28.)

¹³ PST D214b5f.; P244a2f.: 'o na de lta na zhes pa / gal te gang du gtan tshigs bsgrub byas rjes su 'gro ba yin pa de chos mthun pa nyid kyi dpe'o zhes pa mtshan nyid yin na / (Skt. B171b3: *evam tarhīti yadi hetuḥ sādhyānvayo yatra sa sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta iti lakṣaṇam.*)

¹⁴ PST D214b7; P244a4f.: *ma yin te brjod par mi 'dod pa nyid kyi phyir zhes pa bsgrub bya'i gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yod kyang / brjod par 'dod pa yod pa ma yin te /* (Skt. B171b4: *nāvivakṣitatvād iti sann api sādhyasya hetunānugamo na vivakṣyate.*)

¹⁵ Cf. Katsura 2004: 143: "Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example statement is to indicate an external object (*bāhyārtha*) as an example. This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality." Also cf. Katsura 2004: 155: "He (= Dignāga) further states that the main purpose in referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in external reality."

External thing[s] mean [those things] in general that are [similar] in kind to what is to be proved, which are [external] to a particular [thing, that is, a particular property-bearer] such as a pot. [The expression *bāhyārthapradarśanam*, i.e.] “to manifest **external thing[s]**” means to generally manifest the pervasion of a logical reason by what is to be proved in the [external things in the following way:] “Whatever is produced is all necessarily impermanent.”¹⁶

Here, Jinendrabuddhi interprets *bāhyārtha* differently from how he commented on the phrase *bāhyārtha* (*-upasaṃhṛta*) in the third chapter, where he interpreted *bāhyārtha* as “elsewhere than in a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e., the [property-bearer] in general” (*dharmīṇaḥ pakṣīkṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānye*).¹⁷ This gloss shows the contrast between the inside and the outside of the subject (*pakṣa*), and the contrast between particular and generalized property-bearers.

The above quotation, on the other hand, suggests that the term *bāhyārtha* does not mean a particular thing such as a pot, which is one of similar examples, but the generality of things that are similar in kind to what is to be proved (*sādhyajātīyasāmānyā*). In this case, particularity (= an internal thing) is contrasted to generality (= external things). Jinendrabuddhi focuses on the division between an example as an individual thing and a generalized example, but not on the division between a thing inside the subject and things outside the subject.

Next, let us look into the compound *bāhyārthapradarśana*. According to the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, the first half *bāhyārtha* is to be interpreted in the locative sense, i.e. as “in external thing[s],” and the word *vyāpti* is complemented as an object of the last half *-pradarśana*. Thus, the compound as a whole means “indicating the pervasion in external thing[s].” Elsewhere in the same chapter, Jinendrabuddhi presents another interpretation with regard to *bāhyārtha*. He understands *drṣṭānta* as meaning an assembly of things (*artharāśi*), but not as a particular individual thing (*vyaktivīśeṣa*). And that particular individual

¹⁶ PST D215a1f.; P244a6f.: *bum pa la sogs pa'i khyad par las l bsgrub bya'i rigs can gyi spyi ni phyi rol gyi don no[to D] ll de la spyir gang cung zad byas pa zhes bya ba de[de'i P] thams cad mi rtag pa kho na'o zhes bsgrub byas gtan tshigs la khyab pa gsal bar byed pa ni phyi rol gyi don gsal bar byed pa'o ll* (Skt. B171b5f.: *ghaṭāder viśeṣāt sādhyajātīyasāmānyam bāhyo 'rthaḥ, tatra sāmānyena yan nāma kiṃcīt kṛtakam tat sarvam anityam eveti sādhyena hetor vyāptiprakāśanam bāhyārthaparakāśanam.*)

¹⁷ PST D185b2–4; P211a7f. (= Appendix [1]): *phyi rol gyi don nye bar bsdu pas zhes pa l phyogs su byas pa'i chos can gyi khyad par las gzhan du spyi la nye bar bstan pas zhes pa'i don to ll spyi yang khyad par yongs su mi spong pa'i phyir l bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can yang der nang du 'dus pa kho na ste l bsgrub bya'i chos can kho na la med na mi 'byung ba nyid ston pa bsal ba lhur len pa ni phyi rol gyi don smos pa'o ll* (Skt. B146a1–3: *bāhyārthopasaṃhṛteneti. dharmīṇaḥ pakṣīkṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānyā upadarśitenety arthaḥ. sāmānyasya ca viśeṣāparityāgāt, sādhyadharmy api tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharmīny evāvinābhāvitvapradaśananirāsaparam tu bāhyārthagrahaṇam.*) “[The phrase] *bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena* means ‘by [means of two types of exemplification based on the similarity or dissimilarity, in which the inseparable relation] is indicated elsewhere (*anyatra*) than in the particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e. in the [property-bearer] in general.’ And because the general does not abandon a particular, the property-bearer to be proved is also included in it (= the property-bearer in general). The word *bāhyārtha*, on the other hand, is mentioned for the purpose of negating the indication of the inseparable relation only in the property-bearer to be proved.” See also Shiga 2011b: 525f. with n. 18. It is to be noted that Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases the word *bāhyārtha* to *anyatra* here.

thing is described as being included in the assembly of things.¹⁸ For Jinendrabuddhi, the term *bāhyārtha* means “something external to a single and particular individual thing,” or “an assembly of similar things.”

It is worth mentioning in passing that an opponent paraphrases this role of *dr̥ṣṭānta* as: “This exemplification depends on external thing[s]” (**bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanam*).¹⁹ Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases this as “pervasion that depends on external thing[s].”²⁰

3. Examination of the instances in PS/PSV 1

As Katsura (2004) points out, there is still a possibility that the term *bāhyārtha* in *bāhyārthapradarśana* means “an object in the external world” and implies “some positive support in external reality.”²¹ The expression *bāhyārtha* is used at least nine times in PS/PSV 1. An examination of these instances (PSV 1 4, 8; 18, 13; 18, 25; 19, 2; 19, 6; 19, 11; 19, 15; 19, 16; 19, 18) reveals that all of them mean “an external object” or “an object in the external world.”²² It is easily understood that the counterpart of *bāhyārtha* is “an internal thing,” such as cognition, knowledge or the mind.

However, if the term *bāhyārtha*, which is used in logical contexts in PS/PSV 3 and 4, means “an external object,” we encounter certain difficulties. First, Dignāga uses the example *buddhi* in his formulation of this inference: “Sound is permanent, because it is intangible, like cognition.”²³ It is obvious that this *buddhi* is not a so-called ‘external object.’

¹⁸ PST D215a3–5; P244a8–3: *de'i phyir spyis[spyi yis P] ji skad bshad pa'i dpe'i mtshan nyid can gyi don gyi phung po thams cad dpe ste / bum pa kho na[na ni D] ma yin no // bum pa ni de'i nang du 'dus pas te de[om. P] kho na nye bar mtshan pa'i don du dper rjod[brjod P] pa'o // ... **phyi rol gyi don ston pa ni nges par bstan par**[par om. P] **bya la gtso bo'o** zhes pa'i tshig ni gsal ba'i khyad par gcig kho na la rab tu ston pa gtso bo nyid yin pa sel ba lhur byed par blta bar bya'o // (Skt. B171b6–172a2: *tasmāt sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadr̥ṣṭāntalakṣaṇo 'rtharāśir dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ, na tu ghaṭa eva. ghaṭas tu tadantargatas tasyaivopalakṣaṇārtham udāhriyate. ... **bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam iti vacanam ekatraiva vyaktiviśeṣe pradarśanasya prādhānyanirāsaparam draṣṭavyam.**)* “Therefore the example is a whole assembly of things in general that have the characteristic of the example as already stated, but not just a pot. A pot, on the other hand, being included within it (= the assembly of things), is given as an [actual] example for the purpose of implying the very [assembly of things]. ... It should be understood that [Dignāga's] statement: ‘**For the primary [role] of exemplification is to indicate external thing[s]**’ is [made] for the purpose of negating [the view that] to indicate [pervasion] only [in] a single particular individual is its primary [role].” See also Shiga 2011b: 527, n. 23.*

¹⁹ PSV on PS 4.4 (K) 149b1–3; (V) D60b5f.; P64b2f.

²⁰ PST D217a6; P246b7f.: *'dir phyi rol gyi don la ltos pas ci zhig / khyab pa kho nas zhes pa gang du bsgrub byas rjes su 'gro ba zhes pa'i mtshan nyid las so // (Skt. B173b7–174a1: *kim atra bāhyārthāpekṣayā vyāptyaiveti, sādhyenānugamo yatreti lakṣaṇāt.*)*

²¹ See Katsura 2004: 143; 155.

²² The expression *bāhyārthopasaṃhāra* is found in PST 1 160, 7–9: *yadi tāvad viṣaye pravartamānaṃ mana indriyavrttikṛtam anugrahaṃ nāpekṣate, evaṃ satīndriyāṇāṃ sarvathaivānarthakyaṃ syāt, manasaiva bāhyārthopasaṃhārāt puruṣasyopabhogasiddheḥ*. In this case, *bāhyārthopasaṃhāra* means “to comprehend/cover objects in the external world.”

²³ PSV(K) P125b3f. (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): *dper na sgra ni rtag[em. : mi rtag P/Kitagawa] ste / reg bya ma yin pa'i phyir blo bzhin no // de bzhin du mig gi gzung bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir mi rtag zhes bya ba 'di yang bsgrub byar bstan pa'i phyir dam bca' ba thob po // PSV(V) D41a5f.; P43b8–44a1 (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): *dper na sgra rtag ste / reg par bya ba yin pa'i phyir blo bzhin no zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du mig gis gzung bya yin pa'i phyir mi rtag ces bya ba 'di yang bsgrub bya bstan**

Although the formulation that contains the example *buddhi* is presented as fallacious, this is not because *buddhi* is not “an external object,” but because *buddhi* is a pseudo-example that does not have the property to be proved (*nityatva*).²⁴

Furthermore, if we take a close look at the expression *bāhyārtha*, the word *artha* itself can mean “an actual thing” with some factual basis.²⁵ So it is likely that the word *bāhya* is used in the sense of “outside” or “external [to the subject]” and *artha* is used in the sense of “actual example” or a thing that can be verbally expressed or named, i.e., in the sense of *padārtha*.²⁶

4. The expression *bāhyārtha-upasaṃhāra* or *-anupasaṃhāra*

4.1. A usage example found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of exemplification (*udāharaṇa*)

Next, we shall examine cases where the word *upasaṃhāra* or *anupasaṃhāra* comes after *bāhyārtha*.

[Even] if [an opponent states that] the example is qualified by the first half [of the definition of *udāharaṇa* in NS 1.1.36],²⁷ the similarity or dissimilarity to the [property-bearer] to be proved does not need to be mentioned [as a part of the definition of example], because:

[If] so, it (= the example) is not seen as what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. (PS 4.19b)

To wit, when [the example] does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property] (*bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre*), the example does not convey the knowledge of the property to be proved. Alternatively, for that reason, [the necessity of mentioning similarity or dissimilarity] is not established, [because similarity and dissimilarity are

pa'i phyir dam bca' bar thal bar 'gyur ro // (Skt. reconstruction: **tad yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ, asparśatvāt, buddhivat, evam anityaḥ śabdaḥ, cākṣuśatvāc cety etad api sādhyānirdeśāt pratijñā prasajyate*. Cf. NV 274, 4f.) Cf. NP 8, 9: *sādhyadharmāsiddho yathā nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvād buddhivat*.

²⁴ NP 8, 10f.: *yad amūrtaṃ vastu tan nityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā buddhir iti. buddhau hi sādhanadharmo 'mūrtatvam asti, sādhyadharmo nityatvaṃ nāsti, anityatvād buddher*.

²⁵ Also cf. PV 1.26: *tasmād vaidharmyadrṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ / tadabhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgateḥ //* This is Dignāga's view on the substratum (*āśraya*) of *vaidharmyadrṣṭānta*, which is indirectly quoted by Dharmakīrti. They both think that it is not always necessary for a dissimilar example to have a substratum.

²⁶ Cf. *Hetumukha* (?) *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedena, [na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate NVTṬ]*. (Quoted in PVSV 2, 22–3, 1; NVTṬ 51, 11f.; 162, 28f.) See also Frauwallner 1959: 164.

²⁷ The entire Naiyāyika definition of *udāharaṇa* is as follows. NS 1.1.36–37: *sādhyasādhyarmyāt taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam, tadviparyayād vā viparītam*. “The exemplification is an [actual] example that [is supposed to] have [another] property (i.e., the property to be proved) of it (= the property-bearer to be proved) due to the [example's] similarity (i.e., the proving property) to the [property-bearer] to be proved. The counter[-example] is [an actual example that is not supposed to have another property (i.e., the property to be proved) of the property-bearer to be proved] due to its opposite (= the similarity to what is to be proved) (i.e., the dissimilarity to what is to be proved).”

implied] just by [the qualifier:] “having the property of the [property-bearer to be proved]” (*taddharmabhāvitvena*).²⁸

This is found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) in the *paramata*-section of PS/PSV 4. Dignāga asserts that if *dr̥ṣṭānta* “does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property],”²⁹ such *dr̥ṣṭānta* cannot prove what is to be proved. This suggests that *bāhyārthopasaṃhāra* is an indispensable condition for *dr̥ṣṭānta* to prove what is to be proved. Just before this assertion, he also states that if *dr̥ṣṭānta* is treated as separate from the content of the logical reason, a fallacy would occur: a certain thing (e.g. space) could become both a similar and dissimilar example because of its similarity (e.g. being existent) and dissimilarity (e.g. being inaudible) to the property-bearer to be proved (e.g. sound).³⁰

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the use of the words *bāhyārtha* and *upasaṃhāra* in the above quotation as follows:

[The word] *bāhyārtha* in [the phrase] *na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre* means another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity. Furthermore, it (= *bāhyārtha*) [actually] means a pervasion or inseparable relation (*avinābhāvitva*). **The association** (*upasaṃhāra*) of it (= *bāhyārtha* = *avinābhāvitva*) means applying (*upanayana*), i.e. manifesting (*prakāśana*) that [*bāhyārtha*] is an object to be explained. When it (= *upasaṃhāra*) is not present, the example is not what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. ...³¹

²⁸ PSV(K) P153b6–8: *gal te dpe snga mas khyad par du bya ba yin na bsgrub bya dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa smos par mi bya ste l gang gi phyir, de ltar go byed de ma mthong l* (PS 4.19c) *phyi rol gyi don rjes su ma bsdus pa la dpes bsgrub bya'i chos rtogs pa ni yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir de'i chos rtogs pa nyid du ma grub pa kho na yin no //* PSV(V) D64a7–b1; P68a6–8: *gghan yang gal te dpes[dpe yis P] sngon du khyad par du byed na ni bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang mthun pa dang l chos dang mi mthun par 'dzin pa yin[ma yin P] te l go byed du de mthong ma yin //* (PS 4.19c) *phyi rol gyi don gyi rjes thogs su ma smos pa'i dpes ni bsgrub par bya ba'i chos la go bar bya ba yin no zhes chos de rtogs pa nyid du yang mi 'grub po //* (Skt. reconstruction: *yadi pūrveṇa dr̥ṣṭānto viśeṣyate, na sādhyasādharṃyavaidharṃyagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam. yasmāt, naivaṃ sa gamako dr̥ṣṭaḥ (PS 4.19b) *na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre dr̥ṣṭāntasya sādhyadharmagamaka[tvam] astīti taddharmabhāvitvenaiva vāsiddham.*)

²⁹ Or “does not associate [the pervasion or inseparable relation of the proving property with the property to be proved] with external thing[s],” according to Jinendrabuddhi.

³⁰ PSV(K) 153b5f.: *'di la yang gal te gtan tshigs kyi don las dpe tha dad pa yin na dpe gtan tshigs kyi don la 'brel pa nyid du gdon mi za bar brjod par bya bar mi 'gyur ro // de lta na yang byas pa'i phyir mi rtag ste nam mkha' bzhin zhes bya ba yang dper 'gyur te yod pas yod pa'i phyir dang l mnyan bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba 'di la bsgrub par bya va dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa yod pa yin no //* PSV(V) D64a6f.; P68a5f.: *de yang[de yang om. P] gal te gtan tshigs kyi don las dpe logs shig pa yin na ni dpe gtan tshigs kyi don dang rjes su 'brel par brjod par mi bya bar 'gyur ro // de bzhin du byas pa'i phyir na mi rtag pa ste l nam mkha' bzhin no zhes bya bar yang dper 'gyur ro // de'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang mi mthun pa dang l chos dang mthun pa ni yod pa dang mnyan bya nyid dag la sogs pa la yang yod pa[yod pa om. P] yin no //* (Skt. reconstruction: *atrāpi yadi hetvarthāt pṛthag dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ, na dr̥ṣṭānto hetvarthānugata evāvaśyaṃ vācyam syāt. tathā ca kṛtakatvād anitya ākāśavad ity api dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ syāt. asti hy asya sādhyena sādharṃyam vaidharṃyam ca sattvāsṛāvaṇatvādi.)

³¹ PST D230a2f.; P260b4–6 (= Appendix [4]): *phyi rol gyi don nye bar ma bsdus pa zhes pa chos mthun pa nyid dang chos mi mthun pa nyid tsam las gghan pa'i don ni phyi rol gyi don te l de yang khyab pa ste l med na mi 'byung ba nyid do zhes pa'i tha tshig go // de'i nye bar bsdus pa ni rtogs par bya*

Jinendrabuddhi understands *bāhyārtha* as “another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity,”³² then regards it as “pervasion” or “inseparable relation.” These interpretations are unique, in that he takes *bāhya* in the sense of “different” and then identifies it as pervasion.³³

In any case, regarding the word *bāhyārtha*, Jinendrabuddhi calls attention to the fact that *dṛṣṭānta* does not consist of the combination of an actual example (e.g. a pot) and its mere similarity (e.g. being produced)³⁴ or dissimilarity (e.g. not being produced) to the subject (e.g. sound), but instead the combination of *dṛṣṭāntadharmin* and the inseparable relation of a logical reason (e.g. being produced) with what is to be proved (e.g. impermanence).

4.2. Usage examples regarding the Naiyāyika definition of the application (*upanaya*)

Here we will examine the uses of *bāhyārtha* and *bahiḥ* found in the criticism³⁵ against the Naiyāyika definition of the application (*upanaya*).³⁶

ba'i yul nyid du nye bar sbyar ba ste l gsal bar byed pa zhes pa'i don to ll de med na dpe la go bar byed pa nyid med do zhes pa ngag[dag P] gi don to ll (Skt. B185a1–3: **na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra** iti sādharṃyavaidharṃyamātrād anyo 'rtho **bāhyārthaḥ**. sa punar vyāptir avinābhāvitvam iti yāvat. tasyopasaṃhāraḥ pratipādyaviśayatvopanayanam prakāśanam ity arthaḥ. tasminn asati nāsti dṛṣṭāntasya gamakatvam iti vākyārthaḥ.) Cf. HBT 62, 18–20: **sarvasmīn** sādhanadharmavati dharmiṇi na dṛṣṭāntadharṃiṇy eva sādhyadharmasyopasaṃhāraṇam **opasaṃhāro** dhaukanam ...

³² This interpretation seems to reflect Dignāga's preceding assertion that the part of the Naiyāyika definition of exemplification *sādhyasādharṃyāt* is useless, because an example defined as such does not convey the knowledge of the property to be proved. Cf. PST D232b1f.; P263a7: **chos mthun nyid kyang mi rigs 'gyur l zhes[shes P] khyad par med par brjod pa'i phyir l (Skt. **sādharṃyam ca na yujyate** ity aviśeṣanābhīdhānāt.)**

³³ In other words, Jinendrabuddhi here equates ‘the place’ where the association is made (= *bāhyārtha*) with ‘the object’ of the association (= *vyāpti*). And there is another passage in the PST where *bāhyārtha* is interpreted as pervasion. PSV(K) P154a6f.: *gal te khyod kyis bsgrub bya dang sgrub byed dang ldan pa dpe'i don yin na gnyi ga'i chos dang ldan du zin kyang phyi rol gyi don nye bar ma bsdus na bsgrub bya'i don rtog par nus pa ma yin no zhes bshad zin to ll* PSV(V) D64b6; P68b5f.: *gal te khyod kyis bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa'i chos dang ldan pa'i dpe las don yin na ni gnyis ka'i chos dang ldan pas kyang ngag gi don mjug bsdus pa las bsgrub par bya ba'i don rtogs par mi nus so zhes sngar brjod zin to ll* (Skt. reconstruction: *yadi bhavatāṃ sādhyasādhanadharmavatā dṛṣṭāntenārthaḥ, na tūbhayadharmavatāpi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāreṇa sādhyo 'rthaḥ śakyo bhāvayitum ity uktam.) PST D231b1; P262a5: *khyab pa gsal bar byed pa 'di tsam med par bsgrub par bya ba'i don rtogs par nus pa ma yin no zhes sngar bshad zin to ll* (Skt. B186a4: **na tv etāvātā vyāptiprakāśanam antareṇa sādhyo 'rthaḥ śakyo** gamayitum ity uktam prak.)

³⁴ For the meaning of *sādharṃya*, see NBT 152, 8–10 on NB 3.5: *samāno dharmo 'sya so 'yam sadharṃmā. tasya bhāvaḥ sādharṃyam ... dṛṣṭāntadharṃiṇā saha sādhyadharmīṇaḥ sādṛśyam hetukṛtam sādharṃyam ucyate.*

³⁵ The outline of Dignāga's criticism is as follows. According to the Naiyāyika definition of *upanaya*, the property as a logical reason, such as “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*), is applied to the subject, such as “sound.” In that case, it follows that the property *kṛtakatva* could be applied as either a common property or a particularized property. However, fallacies would occur in both cases. It is not possible to apply all kinds of common properties of the example to the subject. (PSV(K) 154b5, PSV(V) D65a4f.; P69a3–5)

³⁶ NS 1.1.38: *udāharaṇāpekṣas tathety upasaṃhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ*. “The application is to associate [the property of the example, i.e., the proving property] with what is to be proved in relation

On the other hand,³⁷ the application [of the property to be proved and/or the proving property] to [a dissimilar example such as] space [in the inference: “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced”] by depending on external thing[s] is correct, because, unlike space [and so on], there is nothing that is produced [and] permanent³⁸ outside [the subject, i.e. sound], whereas, like a pot [and so on], there is something [produced] and impermanent [outside the subject, i.e. sound]. Therefore [sound that is produced] is impermanent. Hence, [the application] is [valid only when it is made] with regard to certain external case[s].³⁹ ...⁴⁰

As we have already seen, both Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi recognize “associating [the property to be proved or inseparable relation] with external thing[s]” (*bāhyārthopasaṃhāra*) as an essential factor of *dr̥ṣṭānta* for a valid inference. And here “external thing[s]” (*bāhyārtha*) are restated as being “outside” (*bahiḥ*), and space and a pot are given as actual examples. According to Jinendrabuddhi, common absence (*vyatireka*) is indicated in space, whereas common occurrence (*anvaya*) is indicated in a pot. And the word *bahiḥ* is men-

to the examples: [the subject] is like [the similar example] or [the subject] is unlike [the dissimilar example].” It should be noted in passing that Viśvanātha glosses the word *upasaṃhāra* as “placing near” (*upanyāsa*) in his *Vṛtti* 313, 26 on NS 1.1.38. Cf. YD 91, 3: *sādhyadr̥ṣṭāntayor ekakriyopasaṃhāra upanayaḥ*. “The association, i.e., the application is to equate an example with what is to be proved.”

³⁷ The preceding passage reads as follows: PSV(K) 155b3f.: *mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs lus can nyid la sogs pa yang med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid 'gog par yang ma gyur cig snyam nas l gang las de med pas rtag par mi 'gyur ba ma byas pa kho na rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs ni ma yin no // PSV(V) D66a1; P69b8–70a1.: ma byas pa nyid ni rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs ma yin te l gang de med pa las rtag par mi 'gyur ro // mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs lus can ma yin pa la sogs pa yang med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid 'gegs pa yang ma yin no //* (Skt. reconstruction: **mā bhūd mūrtatvāder apy anityatvahetor abhāvād anityatvapratīṣedho 'pi. na hy akṛtaka eva nityatvahetuḥ, yataḥ tadabhāvān na nityaḥ syāt.*) “Also regarding [the logical reason] having a fixed form (*mūrtatva*) and the like, it is not [possible] to negate impermanence either, because [*mūrtatva*] is not a [valid] logical reason for [proving] impermanence, for [the fact of] not being produced [would] never be a [valid] logical reason for [proving] permanence; otherwise (= if the fact of not being produced were a valid logical reason for proving permanence) what is permanent would not be present for the reason that it (= the fact of not being produced) is not present.”

³⁸ PST D236a3; P267a4f.: *de nyid kyi phyir gsungs pa l rtag pa nyid byas pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no zhes pa ste l mi rtag pa nyid dang bral ba'i byas pa yod pa ma yin no zhes pa'i don to //* (Skt. B190a3f.: *na hi kiṃcin nityaṃ kṛtakam astīti na kiṃcid anityatvarahitaṃ kṛtakam asti.*)

³⁹ PST D236a4f.; P267a6f.: *rjes 'gro dang ldog pa la ltos[bltos P] nas l de bstan pa'i ched du nam mkha' bzhin dang bum pa bzhin zhes phyogs gcig dper brjod pa tsam nye bar sbyar ba'o zhes pas kho bo'i lugs kyi nam mkha' sogs nye bar sbyar ba[ba'i P] rigs so //* (Skt. B190a4f.: *anvayavyatirekaṃ cāpekṣya tatpradarśanārtham ākāśavad ghaṭavac cety ekadeśa udāharaṇamātram upanīyata iti yukto 'smanmatenākāśādyupanayaḥ.*)

⁴⁰ PSV(K) 155b4–6: *phyi rol gyi don la bltos nas kyang nam mkha' dper byed pa gang gi phyir phyi rol na nam mkha' bzhin du byas pa rtag pa ni med la bum pa bzhin du mi rtag pa yod la de'i phyir mi rtag go zhes bya ba 'ga' zhig gi ni phyi rol na yod pa yin no // nye bar sbyor ba yang de ltar mi rigs pa yin no // PSV(V) D66a1–3; P70a1–3: nam mkha' ni ngag gi don la ltos nas nye bar sbyar bar rigs te gang gi phyir ma byas pa las phyi rol du[tu P] gyur pa'i rtag pa ni cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin te l nam mkha' bzhin no // mi rtag pa la yang bum pa bzhin no zhes bya ba yin no // de'i phyir mi rtag pa'o zhes bya ba nyid kyi nye bar sbyar bar yang rigs pa ma yin no //* (Skt. reconstruction: **bāhyārthāpekṣayā tv ākāśasyopanayo yuktaḥ [ākāśam udāhriyate K], yasmād bahir ākāśavat, na hi kiṃcin nityaṃ kṛtakam asti, anityaṃ cāsti ghaṭavat. tasmād anityam iti kvacid bahir asti. evam upanayo 'py ayuktaḥ.*)

tioned “for the purpose of negating the dependence on the mere [fact that the property to be proved and/or the proving property] is present only in a pot and absent only in space,”⁴¹ which implies that *bāhyārtha* does not refer to a single case, but plural cases. Indeed, on the basis of this passage alone, we cannot decide whether *bāhyārtha* means “an object in the external world” or “external things outside [the subject],” but at least Jinendrabuddhi's comments consistently support the meaning of “external thing[s] outside [the subject].”⁴²

5. *bāhyārtha* and the term and notion of *bahirvyāpti*

As I observed in Shiga 2011b, the expression *anyatra*, which means “in another place [than the location of the property-bearer to be proved],” is found in PS 2.11.⁴³ Dignāga himself comments on this word, presenting a remarkable idea. He introduces the concept of “the generalized substratum” (*ādhārasāmānya*)^{44,45} Jinendrabuddhi glosses the word *anyatra* as “generally (*sāmānyena*) in all cases, e.g. a kitchen.”⁴⁶ He also uses the words *anyatra* and *sāmānya* when he comments on the expression *bāhyārthopasamhṛta* in PSṬ 3.⁴⁷ From this fact, we can safely say that Jinendrabuddhi, for one, sees the terms *bāhyārtha* and *anyatra* as referring to substantially the same thing: that is, property-bearer[s] of the example outside the subject. It is worth noting that he also states that a logical reason (e.g. smoke) is inseparably related not only with the property to be proved (e.g. fire), but also with the generalized substratum (e.g. any place that has fire), because a property-bearer depends on its property, and the property to be proved is particularized by the generalized substratum.⁴⁸

⁴¹ PSṬ D236a2f.; P267a4 (= Appendix [8]): *phyi rol smos pa ni 'ba' zhiḡ pa'i bum pa dang l nam mkha' yod pa dang med pa nyid tsam la ltos[bltos P] pa sems[sem pa P] lhur byed pa'o* // (Skt. B190a3: *kevalaghaṭākāśasadasattvamātrāpekṣatvanirāsaparam bahirgrahaṇam.*)

⁴² Cf. PSṬ D185b2–4; P211a7f. (Skt. B146a1–3).

⁴³ PS 2.11: *liṅgasyāvvyabhicāras tu dharmenānyatra darśyate l tatra prasiddham tadyuktaṃ dharmiṇaṃ gamayīṣyati* // See also Shiga 2011b: 528–532.

⁴⁴ This is paraphrased as “the generalized property-bearer” (*dharmisāmānya*) by Jinendrabuddhi.

⁴⁵ PSV(K) P112b5 (Kitagawa 1965: 461, 11f.): *spyi dang 'di bstan pa nyid yin te gang na du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes rab tu bstan phyir ro* // PSV(V) D30b1; P31b1 (Kitagawa 1965: 461, 11f.): *gzhi thun mong ba nyid du bstan pa ste gang na dud pa yod pa de na me yod[de na med P] do zhes bstan pa'i phyir ro* // (Skt. reconstruction: **ādhārasāmānyena tu pradarśita eva, yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti pradarśanāt.*)

⁴⁶ PSṬ 2 45, 6: *anyatreṭi sāmānyena sarvatra mahānasādau*. Jinendrabuddhi glosses the word *anyatra* in the PSV as “the generalized place that has smoke” (PSṬ 2 45, 10: *dhūmavatpradeśasāmānye*).

⁴⁷ PSṬ D185b2–4; P211a7f. (= Appendix [1]): *phyi rol gyi don nye bar bsdus pas zhes pa l phyogs su byas pa'i chos can gyi khyad par las gzhan du spyi la nye bar bstan pas zhes pa'i don to* // *spyi yang khyad par yongs su mi spong pa'i phyir l bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can yang der nang du 'dus pa kho na ste l bsgrub bya'i chos can kho na la med na mi 'byung ba nyid ston pa bsal ba lhur len pa ni phyi rol gyi don smos pa'o* // (Skt. B146a1–3: *bāhyārthopasamhṛteneti. dharmiṇaḥ pakṣīkṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānya upadarśitenety arthaḥ. sāmānyasya ca viśeṣāparityāgāt, sādhyadharmy api tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharmiṇy evāvinābhāvitvapradarśananirāsaparam tu bāhyārthagrahaṇam.*)

⁴⁸ PSṬ 2 46, 4–9: *ādheyenāvinābhāvitve darśyamāna ādhārenāpi darśitaṃ bhavati. ādheyatantratvād ādhārasya. atha vā yatra dhūmaḥ, tatrāgnir iti nānena dhūmasyāgnimātreṇāvinābhāvitvaṃ kathyate, kiṃ tarhi, ādhārasāmānyaviśiṣṭena. tasmād ādhārasāmānyenāpi tad darśitam eva.* “When it is indicated that [a logical reason] is inseparably related with what is to be contained, it follows that [the inseparable relation of the logical reason] with the container (i.e. the generalized substratum) is also

If these observations thus far are valid, it follows that *bāhya* in the term *bāhyārtha* and *bahir-* in the term “external pervasion” (*bahirvyāpti*) have the same logical value. Dignāga is sometimes described as a “typical” *bahirvyāptivādin* by modern scholars, presumably because he constructed the system of inference, especially the theory of *trairūpya*, which requires presenting the similar (*sapakṣa*) and the dissimilar (*vipakṣa*) as separate from the subject (*pakṣa*).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Dignāga does not declare himself a proponent of *bahirvyāpti*. In Buddhist treatises on logic and epistemology, the term *bahirvyāpti* first appeared in Arcaṭa’s HBT 62, 9; 62, 23; 62, 27.⁵⁰ Śāntarakṣita uses both *bahirvyāpti* and *antarvyāpti* in his VNT 5, 30–6, 7. It should be noted here that Arcaṭa and others understand *bahirvyāpti* as “pervasion that is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved, that is, ‘only’ in a property-bearer of the example,” but this is different from Dignāga’s view. Dignāga does not state that pervasion is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved. Rather, he devised the notion of “the generalized property-bearer” (*ādhārasāmānya*), which can implicitly include the property-bearer to be proved (*sādhyadharmīn*, *pakṣa*).⁵¹

Pātrasvāmin (7–8 cent.),⁵² a Jaina logician who is considered to have been the first to advocate the theory of the single characteristic (*ekalakṣaṇa*) of a logical reason, which is virtually identical to the theory of *antarvyāpti*,⁵³ states that the inseparable relation (*avinābhāvitva*) asserted by Buddhists is acknowledged outside *sādhyā* or in *drṣṭānta*, whereas “being otherwise impossible” (*anyathānupapannatva*) is only acknowledged in the property-bearer to be proved.⁵⁴ Pātrasvāmin’s view was followed by other Jaina

indicated, because a container depends on what is to be contained. Alternatively, it is not stated by this [formulation:] ‘**Wherever there is smoke, there is fire,**’ that smoke is inseparably related [only] with mere fire, but that [the smoke is inseparably related] with the [fire] that is qualified by the generalized substratum. Therefore, that (= the inseparable relation) [of the logical reason] with the generalized substratum is actually indicated.”

⁴⁹ We can describe the relationship between *trairūpya* and *bāhyārthopasaṃhāra* as follows: to confirm the three characteristics of a logical reason (*hetu*), i.e., its being the property of the subject, its being present in *sapakṣa* (which is similar to the subject in that it has the property to be proved [*sādhyadharmā*]) and its not being present in *vipakṣa* (which is dissimilar to *pakṣa* because it does not have *sādhyadharmā*), means to check whether the logical reason is valid, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the logical reason to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of *hetu*.” *bāhyārthopasaṃhāra*, on the other hand, means to associate/apply the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) with/to external things (= *drṣṭāntadharmin*), having the proving property (*sādhanaadharmā*) in the exemplification (*drṣṭānta*) as a member of proof, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the property to be proved to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of *sādhyadharmā*.”

⁵⁰ Cf. HBT(V) D117a3f.; P145b2f.: *ji ltaṛ gṣhan dag gis bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can yongs su spangs nas khyab pa gṣhan rab tu ston pa lta bu ni ma yin te / thams cad smos pas[pa P] ni khyab pa gṣhan dgag pa’i phyir ro //* (For this passage, see also Funayama 2001.)

⁵¹ See Shiga 2011b: 528–533 and Matilal 1985: 129, n. 1.

⁵² For the detail of Pātrasvāmin, see Shiga 2011a: 423–426.

⁵³ See Shiga 2011a: 425f.

⁵⁴ TSP 500, 13f. and PST 2 2, 13f.: *vinā sādhyād adṛṣṭasya drṣṭānte hetuteṣyate / parair mayā punar dharmīṇy asambhūṣṇor vināmunā //* PST 2 2, 10f.: *avinābhāvitvaṃ hi sādhyād bahir iṣyate, anyathānupapannatvaṃ tu dharmīṇy eva sādhyā eveti; 2 3, 4: avinābhāvitvaṃ hi paraiḥ sādhyād bahir iṣyata iti, eṣo ’dhyāropah. Cf. HBT 62, 27–63, 2: na hi sa śyāmaḥ, tatputratvāt, paridrṣyamānaputravad iti*

logicians such as Akalaṅka.⁵⁵ They regarded themselves as proponents of *antarvyāpti* and the Buddhists as proponents of *bahirvyāpti*.⁵⁶ Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that Arcaṭa and other successors of Dharmakīrti did not intend to criticize Dignāga's view directly, but rather to point out that Dignāga was allegedly credited with creating the theory of the so-called *bahirvyāpti*.

6. Conclusion

We can safely state that, as long as we do not disregard Jinendrabuddhi's annotations,⁵⁷ when Dignāga uses the term *bāhyārtha* in connection with *upasamhāra*, *pradarśana* or *apekṣā* in the context of inference, he does not mean "an external object" or "an object in the external world,"⁵⁸ but "external thing[s] outside the subject." It is possible to suppose that Dignāga was well aware of the division between the inside and outside of the subject or property-bearer to be proved.

More specifically, the term *bāhyārtha* found in PS/PSV 3 and 4 refers to (1) "[external] things, that is, the generalized [property-bearer], which is other than a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject" (PST B146a2, Appendix [1]); (2) "the generalized [property-bearer] that is similar in kind to what is to be proved, which is external to a particular [property-bearer] such as a pot" (PST B171b5, Appendix [2]); (3) "an [external] thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity," that is, "pervasion or inseparable relation" (PST B185a2, Appendix [4]); (4) more than simply a single example such as a pot or space (PST B190a3, Appendix [8]). Apart from (3), Jinendrabuddhi's interpretations do not seem to deviate from Dignāga's original intention.

Due to his *trairūpya*-theory, Dignāga is often regarded as the proponent of *bahirvyāpti*. What he intended to maintain, however, might not be the so-called position of *bahirvyāpti* that means, according to Arcaṭa, the pervasion that is to be grasped or observed 'only' in a property-bearer of the example, that is, outside the subject. Rather, it is probable that Dignāga, like Dharmakīrti, assumed some sort of generality or universality regarding pervasion and its substratum.

tatputratvasya śyāmatvena sādhyād bahiḥ paridṛśyamānaputre vyāptipradarśane 'pi sādhyasiddhir bhavati.

⁵⁵ See SVin 5.15cd: *antarvyāptāv asiddhāyām bahirvyāptir asādhanam* // PSaṃ 32cd: *avinābhāvasambandhe 'py antarvyāptyāvatiṣṭhate* // PSaṃ 50cd: *antarvyāptāv asiddhāyām bahiraṅgam anarthakam* //

⁵⁶ Cf. NA 20: *antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahirudāhṛtiḥ / vyarthā syāt tadasadbhāve 'py evaṃ nyāyavido viduḥ* // See also NAVi 401, 10f. on *bahirudāhṛtiḥ*: **bahir** vivakṣitadharmiṇo 'nyatra dṛṣṭāntadharminy **udāhṛtir** vyāptidarśanarūpā ...

⁵⁷ Indeed Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation may have been influenced by Dharmakīrti's thoughts, but it is also problematic to think that Jinendrabuddhi always comments on the PS/PSV by adopting and following Dharmakīrti's theories. There may be cases where Jinendrabuddhi's comments conform to Dignāga's original intention. (Cf. Steinkellner 2004: 227f. with n. 5.)

⁵⁸ We cannot find passages that positively support the meaning of "an object in the external world" in Dignāga's statements on inference either.

As for pervasion, on the other hand, Dignāga asserts the logical predominance of the common absence (*vyatireka*) over the common occurrence (*anvaya*),⁵⁹ and states that *vyatireka* can be grasped or understood by mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*).⁶⁰ Indeed, the pervasion based on Dignāga's system appears to be hypothetical, because pervasion would not be valid if even a single counter-example is found, but it is likely that he thought that pervasion should be universal once it was established.⁶¹ We can assume that Dignāga thought that this universal pervasion should be applied to external cases outside the subject. In addition, since the subject is supposed to be implicitly included in those external cases, it is possible to apply the pervasion to the subject and infer what is to be proved.

Table 1: Dignāga's usage of *bāhyārtha* in logical contexts, with Jinendrabuddhi's comments (PS/PSV/PST 3 and 4)

No.	Dignāga	Jinendrabuddhi
[1]	PSV on PS 3.36b: ⁶² <i>tādṛksāhabhavyam hi sādharmaṇa vaidharmaṇa vā bāhyārthopasamḥrtena dṛṣṭāntadvayena gamyate.</i> (PSV(K) P138a5–7 ; PSV(V) D51a6–b1; P54b5–7)	PST B146a1–3: <i>darmaṇaḥ pakṣīkṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānya upadarśitenety arthaḥ. sāmānyasya ca viśeṣāparityāgāt, sādhyadharmy api tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharmiṇy evāvinābhāvitva-pradarśananirāsaparam tu bāhyārthagrahaṇam.</i>
[2]	PSV on PS 4.3: <i>bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam.</i> (PSV(K) P148b6; PSV(V) D60b2f.; P64a7)	PST B171b5–6: <i>bāhyārthapradarśanam hīti ghaṭāder viśeṣāt sādhyajātīyasāmānyam bāhyo 'rthaḥ, tatra sāmānyena yan nāma kiṃcit kṛtakam tat sarvam anityam eveti sādhyena hetor vyāptiprakāśanam bāhyārthaprakāśanam.</i> See also PST B171b6–172a2: <i>tasmāt sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇo 'rtharāśir dṛṣṭāntaḥ, na tu ghaṭa eva;</i> PST B171b6–172a2: <i>bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam iti vacanam ekatraiva vyaktivīṣeṣe pradarśanasya prādhānyanirāsaparam draṣṭavyam.</i>

⁵⁹ PST 2 47, 16–18: *sarvatrānagnau na dṛṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhānyam vipakṣe sarvatrādarśanena khyāpayati. anyatrāpi ca dṛṣṭa iti. apīśabdena kvacin na dṛṣṭo 'pīti dyotayann anvayasyāprādhānyam.* (See also Pind 2015: II 232.)

⁶⁰ See PS/PSV 5.34 and Pind 2011: 70–73.

⁶¹ For the interpretation of *adarśanamātra*, see Kataoka 2011: 195 with n. 12f. and Pind 1999: 323–330.

⁶² Words in *italics* are not attested in the PST or other texts.

Table continued

No.	Dignāga	Jinendrabuddhi
[3]	PSV on PS 4.4: <i>bāhyārthāpekṣam</i> idaṃ nidarśanam. (PSV(K) P149b3; PSV(V) D60b6; P64b3)	No direct comment. Cf. PST B173b6: <i>na hi sadbhāvamātradarśane bāhyārthāpekṣatvaṃ nidarśanasya yujyate</i> ; PST B173b6–174a1: <i>tataś ca ghaṭe 'nityatvaṃ prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ ca drṣṭam iti kṛte hetoḥ sapakṣe gamyata eva sadbhāvamātram iti kim atra bāhyārthāpekṣayā vyāptyaiveti ...</i>
[4]	PSV on PS 4.19: <i>na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre</i> drṣṭāntena sādhyadharmo gamyate. (PSV(K) P153b7; PSV(V) D64b1; P68a7)	PST B185a1–3: <i>na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra</i> iti sādharṃyavaidharṃyamātrād anyo 'rtho bāhyārthaḥ . sa punar vyāptir avinābhāvitvam iti yāvat.
[5]	PSV on PS 4.20: <i>yadi bhavatām sādhyasādhanadharmavatā drṣṭāntenārthaḥ, na tūbhayadharmavatāpi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāreṇa sādhyo 'rthaḥ śakyo bhāvayitum ity uktam</i> . (PSV(K) P154a6; PSV(V) D64b6; P68b5f.)	No direct comment. Cf. PST B186a3–4: <i>na tv etāvata vyāptiprakāśanam antareṇa sādhyo 'rthaḥ śakyo gamayitum ity uktam prāk</i> ; PST B186a4–6: <i>na hi vastudharmavatāpi drṣṭāntena vinā bāhyārthopasaṃhāreṇa sādhyo 'rthaḥ śakyo bhāvayitum</i> .
[6]	PSV on PS 4.20: <i>na ca</i> drṣṭāntasādhyayor ekīkaraṇād evaṃ anityatvaṃ siddham, bāhyārthānupasaṃhārāt. (PSV(K) P154b8; PSV(V) D65a6f.; P69a6)	No direct comment.
[7]	PSV on PS 4.20: <i>bāhyārthāpekṣayā tv ākāśasyopanayo yuktaḥ</i> . (PSV(K) P155b4f.; PSV(V) D66a1f.; P70a1f.)	No direct comment. See the example [8].
[8]	PSV on PS 4.20: <i>yasmād ākāśavad bahiḥ, na hi kiṃcin nityaṃ kṛtakam asti, anityaṃ cāsti ghaṭavat</i> . tasmād anityam iti kvacid bahir asti. (PSV(K) P155b5f.; PSV(V) D66a2; D70a2f.)	PST B190a2–3: <i>kathaṃ bāhyārthāpekṣa ity āha: yasmād ityādi. kevalaghaṭākāśasadasattvamātrāpekṣatvanirāsaparam bahirgrahaṇam</i> . See also PST B190a3–5: <i>anvayavyatirekaṃ cāpekṣya tatpradarśanārtham ākāśavad ghaṭavac cety ekadeśa udāharaṇamātram upanīyate</i> .

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HB *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Vienna 1967.

- HBṬ** *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Arcaṭa): *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*, ed. S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.
- HBṬ(V)** *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Vinītadeva): (Tib.) D4234, P5733.
- NA** *Nyāyāvatāra* (Siddhasena Divākara): *Jaina epistemology in historical and comparative perspective: critical edition and English translation of logical epistemological treatises: Nyāyāvatāra, Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti and Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippaṇa with introduction and notes*, ed. P. Balcerowicz. 2 vols. Stuttgart 2001.
- NAVi** *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti* (Siddhārṣi): See NA.
- NB** *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): See NBṬ
- NBṬ** *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): *Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra's Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*, ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Patna ²1971.
- NMukh** *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): See Katsura 1981.
- NP** *Nyāyapraveśakasūtra* (Śāṅkarasvāmin): *Nyāyapraveśakasāstra of Baudh Ācārya Dignāga (The father of the Buddhist Logic). With the commentary of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri and with the subcommentary of Pārśvadevaṅṅi*, ed. Muni Jambuvijaya. Delhi/Ahmedabad 2009.
- NS** *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama): *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1936.
- NV** *Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): See NS.
- NVTṬ** *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā* (Vācaspatimiśra): See NS.
- PS** *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga): See PSV.
- PS/PSV 1** *Pramāṇasamuccaya/Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), chapter 1: See Steinkellner 2005.
- PSaṃ** *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* (Akalaṅka): *Akalaṅka Granthatrāyama (Svopajñāvivṛtisahitam Laghīyastrāyama, Nyāyaviniścayaḥ, Pramāṇasaṃgrahaś ca) of Śrī Bhaṭṭakalaṅkadeva*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Ahmedabad/Calcutta 1939.
- PST** *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi): (Tib.) D4268; P5766.
- PST 1** *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi), chapter 1: *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition*, ed. E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser, and H. Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005.
- PST 2** *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi), chapter 2: *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 2. Part I: Critical Edition*, ed. H. Lasic, H. Krasser, and E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2012.
- PSV(K)** *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) translated by Kanakavarman: (Tib.) P5702. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.
- PSV(V)** *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) translated by Vasudhararakṣita: (Tib.) D4204; P5701. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.
- PV** *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): See PVS.
- PVS** *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
- SVin** *Siddhiviniścaya* (Akalaṅka): *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā of Anantavīryācārya: The commentary on Siddhiviniścaya and its vṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. 2 vols. Varanasi 1959.

- TSP** *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. S. D. Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1968.
- VNT** *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (Śāntarakṣita): *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya: With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita*, ed R. Sāṅkrīyāyana. Appendix to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society: New Series* 21–22 (1935–36).
- YD** *Yuktidīpikā: The most significant commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, ed. A. Wezler and Sh. Motegi. Vol. 1. Stuttgart 1998.

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